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Abstract
We propose the Artificial Continuous Prediction Market (ACPM) as a means
to predict a continuous real value, by integrating a range of data sources and aggre-
gating the results of different machine learning (ML) algorithms. ACPM adapts the
concept of the (physical) prediction market to address the prediction of real values
instead of discrete events. Each ACPM participant has a data source, a ML algo-
rithm and a local decision-making procedure that determines what to bid on what
value. The contributions of ACPM are: (i) adaptation to changes in data quality
by the use of learning in: (a) the market, which weights each market participant
to adjust the influence of each on the market prediction and (b) the participants,
which use a Q-learning based trading strategy to incorporate the market prediction
into their subsequent predictions, (ii) resilience to a changing population of low-
and high-performing participants. We demonstrate the effectiveness of ACPM by
application to an influenza-like illnesses data set, showing ACPM out-performs a
range of well-known regression models and is resilient to variation in data source
quality.1
1 Introduction
Physical world prediction markets aim to utilise the aggregated “wisdom of the crowd”
to predict the outcome of a future event [13], such as who will win an election. In these
markets, participants buy and sell instruments, called securities, whose payoffs are tied
to the occurrence of the specified future event. A prediction market is run by a market-
maker who interacts with traders to buy and sell the securities. Artificial Continuous
Prediction Market (ACPM) adapts the concept for the purpose of predicting a real value
1A similar version of this work will is accepted and presented in TRI 2015 workshop (Held at the In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2015 (IJCAI-15)). The workshop proceedings can be
accessed via http://www.ufrgs.br/tri2015/
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in a continuous domain. Our motivation in developing ACPM is to use online learning
in situations in which it is desirable to integrate data dynamically from a variety of
sources whose data quality is (time-)variable, using a variety of analysis algorithms.
A prediction market is created for each prediction that a participant can make based
on the data in their streams. All the data needed for this, including the correct predic-
tion, is referred to as record in accordance with the ML literature. The participants,
which we refer to as agents, predict the value of the record using data from their as-
signed source and their analysis algorithm. Subsequently, the market maker calculates
the market prediction by combining all the individual predictions. Once the true value
of the record is known, the market maker computes the reward for each agent and in-
forms the agents about the outcome so they can update their analysis algorithm and
their trading strategy, with the aim of improving future market predictions.
We use a series of experiments over an influenza-Like Illness (ILI) dataset to show
how ACPM can effectively be applied to the problem of syndromic surveillance. The
main objective and challenge of a syndromic surveillance system is the earliest possible
detection of a disease outbreak within a population. Much research has been done to
discover potential data sources and alternative analysis algorithms for each data source
in the syndromic surveillance domain [2]. An issue with syndromic surveillance data
sources is that data quality fluctuates over time. For example, Google Flu Trends may
show false alerts as a result of a sudden increase in ILI related queries due to unusual
events, such as a drug recall for a popular cold or flu remedy [5]. Therefore, integrat-
ing available data sources according to an adaptive weighting scheme over time seems
necessary. In addition, given that the quality of data changes over time, and the most
suitable algorithm for a given data source is not necessarily known a priori, a reason-
able response is to analyse each data source with a variety of algorithms and integrate
their results.
In the experiments, we predict the level of ILI activity for a specific date in a cer-
tain region using ACPM to integrate the various data sources, analysed by different
algorithms. We show that the system performs at least as well as all the market partic-
ipants and adding learning to the agents’ trading strategy improves market prediction.
The results also highlight that ACPM outperforms well-known regression models and
ensembles, that are commonly used for this type of reasoning. The rest of the paper is
organised as follows. Section 2 explains the details of ACPM. Section 3 evaluates our
model and analyses the results. Section 4 covers related work and concludes.
2 ACPM Description
2.1 Overview
ACPM is an online machine learning technique which adapts the concept of a (physi-
cal) prediction market to populate it with artificial agents as market participants2. We
assume participants are benevolent and self-interest is not an issue, which means they
are not competitive and they work together to get the best outcome of the system. Each
participating agent receives information from its designated data source and analyses
its data with its given analysis algorithm. Each ACPM also includes a market maker
who runs the market, deals with agent transactions and establishes the market predic-
tion.
2The terms participating agent and agent are used interchangeably.
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The market maker instantiates a prediction market for each record with the purpose
of predicting its true value. Each market comprises a number of rounds, where each
agent sends its bids to the market maker. Each bid comprises: (i) a prediction value
which, in our case study would be the number of cases of flu in the USA for a cer-
tain week of the year and (ii) the amount the agent is betting on its prediction. Each
agent, using the data for that record and its accumulated knowledge, analyses the data
and predicts the true value of the record. Then, based on its trading strategy and its
(available) capital, it determines how much to invest. Once a round is completed, the
market maker announces the market prediction based on bids received and an agent
can use this information to update its bid via its trading strategy in subsequent rounds.
The market maker then seals the bid in the last round, i.e deducts capital from the
agent according to its bid, rewards agents and reports the final market prediction. In
this way, the period between the first round and the last round can be used to train the
agents to increase their prediction accuracy based on the integrated predictions of other
participants.
Once the market is over, agents are notified of the correct answer (the true value of
the record) and receive an amount of revenue as determined by a reward function. Each
agent learns from each market, based on the revenue they receive and the losses they
make, in addition to finding out the correct answer. Consequently, they can, if desired,
update their strategy, analysis algorithm and beliefs for future markets. Agents learn by
updating their analysis algorithm with the correct answer for the record and updating
their trading strategy based on how much they could earn if behaving differently (as
explained in Section 2.5). The market maker learns indirectly through updating the
agents’ capital. Their capitals determine their bidding power and hence the weight of
their prediction. The market maker integrates agent predictions using an integration
function and rewards agents based on a reward function. In our continuous variable
prediction setting, the existing discrete existing Market Scoring Rule (MSR) technique
[6] is not suitable for our system. In the next sections, we propose our continuous
versions.
2.2 Integration Function
At the end of each round, the market maker uses an integration function to decide the
market prediction, based on the received bids. We use the following formula:
Market Prediction =
∑n
b=1 Predictionb ∗ Investb∑n
b=1 Investb
(1)
where n is the number of bids
This formula assigns more weight to predictions backed by higher investments. Par-
ticipants who accrue more capital, due to their success in earlier markets, have the
opportunity to invest more and so get greater influence in the market.
2.3 Reward Function
At the last round, agents are notified of the correct answer and receive revenue as deter-
mined by a reward function. These revenues are added to their capital. The reward an
agent receives is inversely proportional to the agent’s prediction error, thus incentivis-
ing accurate prediction, making our reward function incentive compatible. Equation 2
describes a family of reward functions, where different values of P ∈ R+, β ∈ R+
3
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Figure 1: Reward functions. In this figure C = 1, β = 1 and each of the curve lines
refers to one value of P ∈ ( 110 , 19 , ...12 , 1, 2...10).
and C ∈ R+ result in the curves shown in Figure 1, in which P ≥ 1 generates con-
vex functions (above diagonal) and 0 < P < 1 generates concave functions (below
diagonal).
Reward = max(β ∗ −1
CP
∗ errorP + β, 0) (2)
where error = abs(TrueV alue−AgentPrediction). The actual revenue accrued by
an agent is the product of its reward and the amount invested on its prediction. Thus,
the more an agent invests, the more revenue it receives. Consequently, agents with
higher confidence are incentivised to invest more and hence have a greater influence on
the market. In addition, the agents with low capital (indicating low past performance)
cannot invest and influence the market prediction as much as high performing agents,
who acquire more capital over time.
Coefficient C determines the reward cut-off, above which agents receive zero. As
can be seen in Figure 1, the reward function is flat and equal to zero after the cut-off (C
= 1). The slope of the reward function differentiates between the participating agent
rewards in proportion to the error in their predictions. Increasing C, while keeping the
other parameters fixed, decreases the slope of the reward function, and consequently
decreases differentiation. Conversely, increasing C increases the number of agents
that receive rewards. An agent’s error is computed relative to the correct answer for a
given market. As the range of an agent’s error may change from market to market (as
they learn) and from domain to domain, the cut off cannot be a fixed value, but rather
be calculated for each market so that a specific percentage of agents receive positive
rewards. For example, C can be calculated for each market to be equal to the maximum
error of all agents in that market. Intuitively, a certain amount of differentiation is
desirable and lower or higher values of that could harm the performance of the system.
For example, high differentiation means that a few high quality agents lead the market
and predictions of the majority of agents, including good quality ones, can be under-
weighted. On the other hand, low differentiation narrows the gap between the influence
of high and low quality agents, so that insufficient account is taken of the more accurate
agents.
Coefficients P and β shrink (or enlarge) the function horizontally and vertically
respectively. Increasing P increases the degree of curvature of the reward function,
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and consequently, decreases the differentiation among agents especially those with low
errors. Increasing β has the effect of a linear increase in both agent revenue and in
differentiation between participants. With β = 1, an agent loses a fraction of its money
according to the error they make and only in the best case, where the error is zero, do
they neither earn nor lose. This value disincentives participation, since return is less
than investment and the steady depletion of capital leads to their holding very little in
later markets. The default values of P=1 and β = 2 generate a simple linear reward
function which has the property of being incentive compatible.
2.4 Rate Per Transaction
The system has two other parameters: Maximum Rate Per Transaction (MaxRPT) and
Minimum Rate Per Transaction (MinRPT), which specify the maximum and minimum
percentage of the capital that each participant can invest. The purpose of the MaxRPT
parameter is to prevent unsuccessful agents bankrupting themselves and being elimi-
nated from the market. It is not desirable to reduce the population, because that leads
to the loss of a data feed or the loss of an analysis algorithm: while qualitatively low
at some point, the combination might improve again over time. The MaxRPT param-
eter can be used to tune system response to the degree of environment volatility. For
example, in situations where the quality of agents’ data fluctuates frequently, MaxRPT
should be high so that an affluent agent loses most of its capital if its error is high for a
few successive markets. On the other hand, MaxRPT should be low in situations where
we expect that the quality of good agents remains good even though they may make
occasional mistakes. If MaxRPT < 1, an agent’s capital may get very small but is
not used up entirely. Hence it can invest and recover at any time, albeit slowly!. The
purpose of MinRPT is to prevent the system from being unresponsive in cases where
none of the participating agents have enough incentive to invest.
2.5 Agent Trading Strategy
As mentioned earlier, agents can use the market prediction, received from the market
maker at the end of each round, to update their bids for subsequent rounds. In this
paper, we examine two strategies: a constant one and a Q-Learning based one.
Constant Strategy: Agents simply dedicate a fixed ratio of their capital to bid in
each round. In this paper, this percentage is equal to MaxRPT. This naı¨ve strategy
ignores the advantage of updating the prediction on the basis of the market prediction
of the previous round.
Q-Learning Trading Strategy: In reinforcement learning, agents explore their en-
vironment and learn to choose actions that maximise their rewards. Agents are seen
as finite state machines. They receive a reward for the action they take to reach an-
other state. In the Q-learning algorithm [17], agents have a state action value function
Q(s, a) which estimates the expected reward for performing an action a in state s. A
greedy policy suggests choosing the action that gives the highest expected reward in
the given state.
In our Q-learning based trading strategy, agents recognise their state by (i) measur-
ing the difference between their prediction and the market prediction of the previous
round, (ii) the current round number. Here, we have just two actions. The difference
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between these two actions is whether the agent use the market prediction as another
source of information or not to change its prediction. While the first action (PreservePr)
suggests the agent ignores the market prediction of the previous round, the second one
(ChangePr) suggests the agent shifts its prediction linearly by a percentage, called δ,
towards the market prediction.
In both actions, the agent uses a simple betting strategy which assumes that the
correct answer is equal to the market prediction of the previous round. Based on this
assumption and its prediction value, as calculated by its analysis algorithm, the agent
estimates its error which is absolute difference of agent prediction and market predic-
tion. Then, the agent uses the estimated error and the reward function setting, which
was used by the market maker in the previous market, to estimate its expected reward.
If the expected reward is less than one, which means that the agent earns less than what
it invests, then the betting strategy suggests the agent invests MinRPT percentage of its
capital, and otherwise MaxRPT of the capital3.
Agents update their state action value function once the market is over and the
correct answer is revealed. Each agent revises all States s, which it was confronted with
during the market period. The agent assigns the state action values for each Action a
in State s equal to the the amount of net revenue – its revenue minus the investment
amount – it could obtain by performing Action a in State s. The agent also calculates
and stores what was the best value of δ for state s. Formula 3 linearly calculates the
percentage the agent should shift its prediction towards the market prediction, with a
limit of 100 percent.
δ = min(abs(
correct answer− agent prediction
market prediction− agent prediction ), 1) ∗ 100% (3)
In the first market, as the agent’s knowledge is void, the agent just bids the MinRPT
percentage of its capital. In all other markets, the agents have no information about the
market prediction in the first round, therefore they use the constant strategy. In all other
rounds, agents use a greedy strategy which means they refer to their state action value
function and choose the action with the highest state action value.
3 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of ACPM by applying it to syndromic surveillance in
the USA. In this context, the system predicts the disease activity level of influenza-
like illnesses (ILI) in a given week in the whole of the USA using publicly available
data sources. The data used here contains more than 100 real data streams covering
the period 4th January 2004 to 27th April 2014, from a variety of sources including
Google Flu Trends (GFT), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Google
Trend.
We have used weekly Google Flu Prediction for different areas of the United States
including states, cities and regions for which GFT data is available since 2004. Google
Trend statistics for different terms such as “flu”, “fever cough sore throat”, “flu symp-
toms” and CDC statistics4 including CDC ILI rate for different age groups, USA
national ILI rate, total number of patients and total number of outpatient healthcare
3Two other models of betting strategy were tried, but this one both maximises system performance and
agent utility.
4CDC reports ILI rates with a two-week time lag. Therefore, in order to align CDC data with the other
data streams used, we take the ILI rate from two weeks earlier for each week of the experiment period.
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providers in ILI network are used5. The ACPM prediction is compared against the
CDC ILI rate.
We refer to data streams as having low, medium or high quality, based on their
mean absolute error (MAE) as reported by several regression models. These categories
are not absolute judgements, but relative ones confirmed through the use of several
classifiers in order to cluster the data streams according to their mean absolute error
(MAE) and hence identify threshold values that fall between the clusters.
3.1 Hypotheses
Using two sets of experiments, we evaluate ACPM against the following hypotheses:
H1: ACPM performance is higher than its best performing agent.
H2: ACPM is resilient to different proportions of low- and high-performing partici-
pants.
H3: Adopting the Q-learning trading strategy, compared to the constant strategy, im-
proves ACPM performance.
H4: The Q-learning trading strategy encourages low quality agents to change their
prediction based on aggregated prediction of other agents.
H5: The Q-learning trading strategy encourages high quality agents to ignore market
prediction as another source of information.
H6: ACPM outperforms well-known regression models
and ensembles.
H7: Adopting Q-learning based trading strategy improves each participating agent’s
performance.
3.2 Set 1
The first group of experiments explores the impact of data quality on ACPM’s predic-
tive capability.
Settings For these experiments we look at four different market types (Table 1) with
different proportions of participant data stream quality. Market type 1 comprises only
agents with medium quality data. In order to investigate how the presence of a small
number of low and high quality agents affect ACPM performance, market type 2 com-
prises mostly medium and a few high quality data agents and market type 3 contains
mostly medium and several low quality data agents. Market type 4 contains all three
kinds (a small number of low and high quality and many medium quality data agents).
Each market type has 100 agents.
In these experiments, all agents use the Q-learning trading strategy and, randomly
selected, analysis algorithm, namely SGD 6 algorithm. There is no specific reason for
the use of SGD: it is just one of the several used for the initial clustering. The effective
values of market parameters, as discussed in Section 2, can experimentally be chosen
by measuring the performance of the system on historical records. Experiments gave
us: (i) number of rounds = 2, (ii) MaxRPT= 0.9, (iii) MinRPT= 0.001, (iv) P = 7,
(v) β = 4, and (vi) C is chosen so that 60% of agents receive positive rewards.
5These data can be accessed from http://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/fluview/fluportaldashboard.html
6SGD loss function is set to Squared Loss function for the purpose of performing regression.
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Low Data Quality Agents Medium Data Quality Agents High Data Quality Agents
Market Type
Average Error
(Variance) Quantity
Average Error
( Variance) Quantity
Average Error
(Variance) Quantity
Average Error
(Variance)
Type 1
0.6043
(0.0007) 0 - 100
0.6042
(0.0007) 0 -
Type 2
0.6009
(0.0009) 0 - 97
0.6033
(0.0008) 3
0.5243
(4.79002E-05)
Type 3
0.6214
(0.0030) 12
0.7423
(0.0020) 88
0.6048
(0.0008) 0 -
Type 4
0.6198
(0.0033) 13
0.7406
(0.0019) 84
0.6044
(0.0008) 3
0.5243
(4.79002E-05)
Table 1: Our four market types. Data streams are divided into three categories of low,
medium and high quality based on their mae as determined by several regression mod-
els. Table rows describe market types according to data quality of their participants.
Experiments The first experiment (Figure 2), compares the MAEs of the system and
the best performing participant for each market type. Next, (Figure 3), we compare,
for each market type, the MAE of ACPM where participants use Q-learning with one
where participants do not. In the last experiment of this set, as displayed in Figure 4,
we compare the use of the Q-learning actions for each agent-type in a type 4 market.
Results These experiments indicate that, as shown in Figure 2, the system’s MAE is
less than the best agent’s MAE, without manipulating its prediction using Q-learning
strategy, for every market type. The error bars show the standard error when calculating
the mean absolute error. Experiments are run once as they are deterministic. Figure 3
shows that adopting the Q-learning reduces the MAE compared to the constant trading
strategy in each market type (P-value 7 < 0.05 for all market types except Type 3).
As can be seen from Figure 4, Action PreservePr which suggests the agent not
change its prediction, based on the previous round market prediction (as discussed in
Section 2.5), is the most popular action in agents with high quality data and the least
popular action in agents with low quality data. Conversely, Action ChangePr which
suggests the agent change its prediction by rate δ, based on the previous round market
prediction, is the most popular action in agents accessing low quality data and the least
popular action in agents accessing high quality data.
3.3 Set 2
The next group of experiments compares ACPM with well-known regression models
and ensembles.
Settings In this set of experiments, the market includes 14 participants, each agent
has access to all 100 data streams of type 4 market, described in Table 1. Each
agent uses one of the following regression models : SGD, IBK, LinearRegression,
SMOreg, REPTree, ZeroR, DecisionStump, SimpleLinearRegression, DecisionTable,
LWL, Bagging, AdditiveRegression, Stacking and Vote as its analysis algorithm. The
market runs for two rounds and all participants use the Q-learning trading strategy. In
these experiments, the market parameters, except C, are the same values as in the first
set of experiments. Experiments indicated that, as the number of participating agents
is relatively small, C is best set for each market to maximum error so that all agents
7The null hypothesis is that the two accuracies compared are not significantly different.
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Figure 2: Comparing ACPM performance with the best performing participant perfor-
mance for each market type.
Figure 3: Comparison of ACPM’s performance with Q-learning and without.
receive positive rewards. Then the performance of ACPM is compared with same mod-
els mentioned above as benchmarks. They are run independently without the concept
of ACPM. These models use same data as ACPM agents do, and similar to ACPM are
run incrementally8. For each available record, they predict the true value and then are
retrained again with the correct answer and all seen records. All models, both in ACPM
and benchmarks, are implemented using Java Weka API (3-7-10) and configured with
their default parameters.
8Please note that their performance should not be compared with when they are run using batch training.
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Figure 4: Popularity of each action for agents accessing different quality of data
streams.
Experiments In our first experiment (Figure 5) we compare ACPM’s MAE with
the MAE of each of the regression models and ensemble methods by means of the
MAE of the agents that use the method as their analysis algorithm. We then go on in
Figure 6 to compare the difference of MAE between classifier/ensemble if the agent
was employing Q-learning or not.
Results Our experiments show (see Figure 5) that ACPM has a lower MAE than all
regression models and ensembles (P-value is less than 0.001 for all except IBK (P-
value= 0.08), SMOReg (P-value= 0.07)). They further demonstrate that an agent
using well-known regression models can reduce its MAE when it uses Q-learning.
Figure 6 demonstrates that the performance of each classifier is improved by par-
ticipating in the market and using the Q-leaning trading Strategy (highly significant for
all except IBK and SMOReg).
3.4 Analysis
A number of our hypotheses are satisfied immediately from our experiments. Given
that the MAE of ACPM is always lower than the best performing agent in any market
type, we can safely state that it performs better (H1) and that the system is resilient to
different proportions of low- and high-performing participants (H2). Based on our first
experiment, it is not surprising that ACPM performs better than regression models or
ensemble methods (H6), as demonstrated in Figure 5.
The system attains its high performance by granting more influence to those that
have high quality data sources and effective analysis algorithms. The reward function
rewards the market participants according to their prediction accuracy and the amount
invested. Obviously, lower error and higher investment leads to higher revenue. In this
way, agents are incentivised to make accurate predictions and adjust their investment
based on their confidence in the prediction. After a few markets (records), the differ-
ences between agent capital becomes apparent as some of the agents gain revenue and
10
Figure 5: Comparing ACPM performance with well known machine learning regres-
sion models and ensembles.
Figure 6: How participating in ACPM and utilising Q-learning strategy improves the
performance of each classifier.
some of the agents loose a proportion of their capital as a result of their performance.
The integration function weights each prediction by the amount of investment. In this
way, higher quality agents acquire greater influence in predicting the outcome of the
event, since they gain more capital over time, and consequently can invest more in their
bids.
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The other reason for the performance of the system is that the agents learn to im-
prove their prediction by considering market prediction as another source of informa-
tion. Figures 3 and 6 show that Q-learning does improve each agent’s performance
and consequently the system’s performance by adding a further reduction in prediction
error; hence supporting hypotheses H3 and H7. Using the Q-learning trading strategy,
each agent learns the extent to which it should use the market prediction to update its
prediction. Therefore, while high quality agents ignore market predictions, low quality
agents learn to minimise the amount of noise (low accurate prediction) they send to
the market maker. This is demonstrated in Figure 4 and confirms H4 and H5. The
validity of the ACPM approach through its application to several of the UCI data sets
is confirmed, but cannot be presented here due to sake of space.
4 Related Work and Conclusion
We proposed an Artificial Continuous Prediction Market (ACPM) for predicting a con-
tinuous variable based on the integration of diverse data sources with different varying
quality. It acts as an adaptive ensemble algorithm which is capable of shifting focus in
response to changes in individuals’ predictions.
To our knowledge, there is relatively little research on artificial prediction markets
as a machine learning technique. Our work is different from related works in artificial
prediction markets [12, 1, 15, 11, 8], prediction with expert advice and its subfields
[16, 3, 4, 7, 10, 14, 9], opinion pools and all ensemble techniques as learning happens
at two levels, i.e. market and agents. The market learns the weighting of each agent on
the market prediction dynamically while participants revise their beliefs and can retrain
themselves (i) after each round of a market by comparing their prediction with market
prediction to maximise their utility in the current market. (ii) after each market in order
to maximise their utility in future markets. Finally, we note that previous works are
designed for discrete classification and our work is designed to predict a continuous
variable.
Our next step is to develop an intelligent market that can self-select the appropriate
parameters for the market based on the characteristics of market participants and their
data sources. We also plan to apply ACPM on different domains, such as, for example,
stock market and cancer predictions.
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